

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4052

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 PARIS 26662

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, FR

SUBJECT: MARTINIQUE SUMMIT -- PART II

1. SUMMARY: THIS TELEGRAM IS PART II OF THE EMBASSY'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE WHITE HOUSE AND DEPARTMENT'S PREPARATION FOR THE MARTINIQUE SUMMIT. PART I GAVE GENERAL OVERVIEW OF FRENCH OBJECTIVES AND PROBABLE STRATEGY. THIS MESSAGE DISCUSSES POSSIBLE AGENDA ITEMS AND PROVIDES EMBASSY RECOMMENDATIONS. END SUMMARY.

2. ENERGY: GISCARD WILL SEEK TO CONVINCE US THAT THE FRENCH PROPOSAL FOR A TRIPARTITE OIL NEGOTIATION IS WORTH PURSUING EARLY IN 1975, AND THAT IT NEED NOT RUN COUNTER TO OUR EFFORTS TO CREATE CLOSER COOPERATION AMONG OIL CONSUMERS. THE FRENCH ARE ANXIOUS THAT AN EARLY CONSUMER-PRODUCER NEGOTIATION BEGIN, NOT ONLY BECAUSE IT IS THEIR INITIATIVE BUT BECAUSE THEY SEE IT AS THE BEST WAY TO MAINTAIN THEIR FREEDOM OF ACTION BETWEEN THE PRODUCERS AND WHAT THEY CLAIM TO FEAR IS A GROWING CONSUMER BLOC HEADED BY THE US. WHILE THEY AGREE THAT SOME CONSUMER COOPERATION IS VITAL, THEY WANT IT TO BE CONCENTRATED IN THE FORUMS OF THE EC AND OECD, WHERE THEY HAVE A GREATER ROLE AND PERCEIVE LESS VULNERABILITY FOR THEIR INTERESTS IN THE EVENT OF A PRODUCER-CONSUMER CONFRONTATION OR A NEW MIDDLE EAST WAR. WE WILL PRESUMABLY CONTINUE TO STRESS THAT WHILE ENERGY QUESTIONS MUST BE DEALT WITH IN THE BROADEST

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POSSIBLE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT' OIL PRICE NEGOTIATIONS

BEFORE THE CONSUMERS HAVE A COMMON POSITION, OR PROPOSALS TO MAKE, ARE LIKELY TO BE UNHELPFUL. IF TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS NONETHELESS INDICATE BY DECEMBER THAT WE SHOULD ACCEPT THE FRENCH INVITATION TO ATTEND AT LEAST A PREPARATORY CONFERENCE, WE SHOULD SEEK TO GAIN IN RETURN THE MAXIMUM POSSIBLE FRENCH ACCEPTANCE OF TIGHTER MULTILATERAL CONSUMER COOPERATION, INCLUDING THE IEA.

3. ENERGY - DEMAND RESTRAINT: THE FRENCH ARE LIKELY TO ASK WHAT STEPS THE US INTENDS TO TAKE TO RESTRAIN DEMAND FOR ENERGY. THEY BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT FOR THE SUCCESS OF SUCH MEASURES IN OTHER CONSUMER COUNTRIES, OR EVEN IN SOME CASES FOR THE INITIATION OF "RATIONING" OF ENERGY, THAT THE U.S., AS THE MOST IMPORTANT AND THE MOST WASTEFUL CONSUMER, TAKE THE LEAD. THE U.S. SIDE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE THE FRENCH WITH A DETAILED SUMMARY OF OUR PLANS FOR REDUCING DEMAND.

4. ENERGY - RECYCLING: THE QUESTION OF RECYCLING IS LIKELY TO ARISE IN ANY DISCUSSION OF ENERGY. THE FRENCH HAVE RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE CAPACITY OF EURO-DOLLAR MARKETS TO MEET THE RECYCLING NEED. FRENCH OFFICIALS AND BANKERS ALIKE BELIEVE THAT BILATERAL AGREEMENTS SUCH AS THE FRANCO-IRANIAN DEAL ARE THE SUREST WAY TO RECYCLE (BUT NOT THROUGH DIRECT INVESTMENT ON THE KRUPP MODEL, WHICH FRANCE REJECTS.) FRANCE FAVORS BORROWING BY THE IMF, IBRD, EC AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. THE U.S. SHOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS IN DETAIL OUR OWN RECYCLING PROPOSALS.

5. MIDDLE EAST: DESPITE CAMPAIGN HINTS THAT HE WOULD FOLLOW A MORE PRO-ISRAELI POLICY, GISCARD HAS MAINTAINED FRANCE'S BASICALLY PRO-ARAB STANCE. ALTHOUGH FRANCE RECENTLY LIFTED ITS ARMS EMBARGO TO COMBATANT COUNTRIES, IT VOTED FOR PALESTINIAN PARTICIPATION IN UNGA DEBATE, ITS FOREIGN MINISTER MET WITH PLO CHIEF ARAFAT, AND FRANCE APPARENTLY IS CONSIDERING RECOGNITION OF A PALESTINIAN GOVERNMENT IN EXILE WHEN PROCLAIMED. HEAVY DEPENDENCE (50 PERCENT OF TOTAL ENERGY REQUIREMENTS)
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ON MIDDLE EASTERN OIL, THE CONTINUING DESIRE FOR "EUROPE" TO PLAY A ROLE IN THE SETTLEMENT PROCESS, AND THE POLICY OF FRENCH "INDEPENDENCE" SHAPE FRENCH ACTION IN THE REGION. GISCARD WILL BE INTERESTED IN AN OUTLINE OF THE US POSITION ON SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND IN OUR RECENT DISCUSSIONS WITH MIDDLE EASTERN LEADERS. HE MAY SEEK TO EXPLAIN THE INCREASED EMPHASIS GIVEN TO

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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4053

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 05 PARIS 26662

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THE PLO BY FRANCE. HE WILL TRY TO CONVINCE US OF THE UTILITY OF FRANCE'S STANCE TO SETTLEMENT EFFORTS AND TO GAIN OUR SUPPORT FOR THE FRENCH ROLE THEREIN.

6. F-104 REPLACEMENT: THE FRENCH ARE AWARE OF THE INCREASING LIKELIHOOD THAT A US AIRCRAFT WILL REPLACE THE F-104. GISCARD CAN BE EXPECTED TO RAISE THE ISSUE AND STRESS THE IMPACT OF SUCH A DECISION ON FRENCH AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY. HE MAY EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITIES OF SHARING THE CONSORTIUM MARKET OR, FAILING THAT, SOME SORT OF WORLD-WIDE AIRCRAFT MARKET-SHARING PLAN. IT IS TRUE THAT A CONSORTIUM DECISION TO BUY AN AMERICAN PLANE WILL HAVE SERIOUS POLITICAL REPERCUSSIONS IN FRANCE; AND, WHILE THE ECONOMIC IMPACT ON THE FRENCH AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY WILL NOT BE IMMEDIATE, SERIOUS LABOR PROBLEMS COULD RESULT. WE SHOULD LISTEN SYMPATHETICALLY TO THE FRENCH DISCUSSION OF THIS PROBLEM BUT POINT OUT OUR OWN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS IN REGARD TO OUR AEROSPACE INDUSTRY.

7. COOPERATION ON CIVIL AIRCRAFT CONSTRUCTION: DISCUSSION OF F-104 REPLACEMENT COULD LEAD TO AN EXPLORATION OF POSSIBILITIES FOR COOPERATION WITH US IN CIVIL AIRCRAFT CONSTRUCTION, SINCE THE CIVIL SECTOR IS THE MOST SICK IN THE FRENCH AEROSPACE INDUSTRY. THERE HAVE BEEN SOME HINTS IN THE PAST THAT THE GOF MIGHT TRY TO INTEREST US IN JOINT DEVELOPMENT OF A SECOND

GENERATION SST. SERIOUSNESS OF SUCH A PROPOSAL
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AT THIS TIME COULD BE QUESTIONED, SINCE THE COSTLY CONCORDE PROGRAM IS STILL CONTROVERSIAL IN FRANCE AND COMMITMENT OF SUBSTANTIAL FUNDS TO A NEW SST PROGRAM WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THE GOF TO JUSTIFY IN A PERIOD OF SUPPOSED BUDGETARY STRINGENCY. GISCARD COULD ALSO SIMPLY BE SEEKING A SHOW OF US INTEREST "IN PRINCIPLE" IN FUTURE SST DEVELOPMENT AS A MEANS OF ENHANCING THE COMMERCIAL ATTRACTIVENESS OF CONCORDE OVER THE SHORT TERM; NEGATIVE REACTION FROM US COULD BE USED DOMESTICALLY TO SHIFT PART OF THE BLAME TO THE US IF AND WHEN GOF TERMINATES THE PRESENT CONCORDE CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM. THE FRENCH SIDE MIGHT ALSO EXPLORE POSSIBILITIES FOR COOPERATION IN CONSTRUCTION OF SUBSONIC AIRCRAFT, AN AREA IN WHICH FRENCH OFFICIALS HAVE RECENTLY EXPRESSED INTEREST. US COMPANIES HAVE THUS FAR SHOWN LITTLE INTEREST IN JOINT VENTURES IN THIS AREA WITH THE FRENCH. WE SHOULD NOT RULE OUT GENERAL ENCOURAGEMENT OF SUCH COOPERATION AS MEANS OF SHARING R&D COSTS (AND AS LONG-TERM INSURANCE FOR PROTECTING OUR OVERSEAS MARKETS), BUT WE SHOULD STRESS THAT ON OUR SIDE, AT LEAST, INITIATIVE MUST COME FROM INDUSTRY AND NOT FROM GOVERNMENT. GE-SNECMA COOPERATION CAN BE CITED AS EXAMPLE OF SOUND COOPERATION BETWEEN FRENCH AND US AEROSPACE INDUSTRIES.

8. CONCORDE SERVICE TO THE US: GISCARD MIGHT SEEK USG ASSURANCE THAT CONCORDE WILL BE PERMITTED TO FLY COMMERCIALY TO THE US AND REQUEST USG ASSISTANCE IN SECURING NECESSARY LANDING AUTHORIZATIONS. INABILITY OF THE FRENCH TO OPERATE CONCORDE ON THE PRESTIGE ROUTE PARIS-NEW YORK WOULD PRODUCE AN ADVERSE POPULAR REACTION IN FRANCE. THE GOF SHOULD BE REMINDED AGAIN THAT AT KENNEDY AND OTHER US MUNICIPAL AIRPORTS LANDING AUTHORIZATION IS DECISION OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES AND NOT USG. STANDARDS FOR SST NOISE LEVEL HAVE YET TO BE ISSUED BY THE FAA, BUT WE REMAIN ALERT TO THE SPECIAL PROBLEM CONCORDE HAS IN THIS REGARD. PENDING EPA RULES ON SST ENGINE EXHAUST EMISSIONS WOULD NOT APPLY TO ENGINES BUILT BEFORE 1979 WHICH WOULD EXEMPT PRESENT CONCORDES, WE STAND BY EARLIER ASSURANCES TO POMPIDOU THAT THE USG WILL NOT DISCRIMINATE AGAINST CONCORDE.

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9. EUROPE: GISCARD HAS FOCUSED MAJOR ATTENTION ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF A CONFEDERATED EUROPE GENERALLY ALONG THE LINES ENVISIONED BY HIS TWO PREDECESSORS. THIS EFFORT, WHICH WILL BE RENDERED MORE DIFFICULT BY THE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS THAT FRAGMENT EUROPE, MAY RISK RENEWING EARLIER TENSIONS BETWEEN THE US AND THE EMERGING EUROPEAN IDENTITY. UPPERMOST IN GISCARD'S MIND IS THE APPREHENSION THAT THE US MIGHT BE DETERMINED TO FRUSTRATE ANY MOVEMENT TOWARD CLOSER EUROPEAN UNITY. WE HOPE THAT PRESIDENT FORD WILL PUT TO REST THIS MISAPPREHENSION, AT THE SAME TIME MAKING CLEAR TO GISCARD OUR BELIEF THAT EUROPE CAN AND OUGHT TO BE CONSTRUCTED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF BROADER ATLANTIC COOPERATION.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 05 PARIS 26662

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10. FAR EAST: FRENCH MAY ASK OUR VIEWS OF THE SUCCESSION PROBLEM IN CHINA AND HOW THE POLICIES OF THE SUCCESSORS TO MAO AND CHOU MAY INFLUENCE NOT ONLY WESTERN RELATIONS WITH THE PRC AND EAST/WEST DETENTE, BUT ALSO THE DYNAMICS OF THE USSR/US/PRC/JAPANESE EQUILIBRIUM IN ASIA. IN THE CONTEXT OF ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL AND ENERGY PROBLEMS THE FUTURE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STABILITY OF JAPAN WILL INTEREST GISCARD. AS FOR INDO-CHINA, THE FRENCH WILL WISH TO HAVE OUR EVALUATION OF THE SUCCESS OF THE LAO EXPERIMENT IN COALITION GOVERNMENT, THE ABILITY OF THE GVN TO HOLD ITS OWN IN

THE COMING MONTHS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF A COMPROMISE
SOLUTION IN CAMBODIA.

11. SALT: GISCARD WILL BE PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN
PRESIDENT FORD'S COMMENTS ON THE LIKELY EVOLUTION
OF SALT NEGOTIATIONS. FROM THE FRENCH POINT OF VIEW,
GISCARD WOULD LIKE TO BE SURE THAT THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS
DO NOT

- AFFECT FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCES
- REDUCE US FBS IN AND AROUND EUROPE
- FORECLOSE THE POSSIBILITY OF TRANSFER OF
US NUCLEAR WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY TO FRANCE.

WE SHOULD RECALL TO GISCARD THAT OUR OBJECTIVE IN SALT
IS TO ACHIEVE A STRENGTHENING OF OVERALL DETERRENCE.
WE SHOULD REASSURE HIM THAT THE US WILL CONTINUE CLOSE
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AND TIMELY CONSULTATIONS WITH OUR ALLIES ON SALT.

12. CSCE: ON THE BASIC SUBSTANCE OF CSCE, WE AND THE
FRENCH SEEM TO SHARE GENERALLY THE SAME POINTS OF VIEW.
ON TACTICS AND TIMING, DIFFERENCES EXIST BETWEEN THE
US AND MANY OF OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES INCLUDING THE FRENCH,
BUT THESE DIFFERENCES HAVE BEEN KEPT TO MANAGEABLE
PROPORTIONS. WE SHOULD SEEK FRENCH
SUPPORT FOR OUR TACTICAL APPROACH TO CSCE WHILE TAKING
INTO ACCOUNT REASONABLE FRENCH VIEWS ON THOSE ISSUES
WHERE WE HAVE DIFFERENCES.

13. MBFR: WE SEE NO EVIDENCE THAT FRANCE IS PREPARED
TO PARTICIPATE IN MBFR NEGOTIATIONS AT THIS TIME. MORE-
OVER, A MOVE TO INJECT US NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS A SUBJECT
FOR NEGOTIATION AT THE VIENNA TALKS WOULD STRENGTHEN
FRANCE'S DECISION TO STAY AWAY. THE FRENCH UNDERSTAND
THAT DOMESTIC US POLITICAL PRESSURES MAY REQUIRE A
REDUCTION OF US FORCES STATIONED IN EUROPE. THEY WOULD
PREFER, HOWEVER, TO SEE SUCH REDUCTIONS MADE UNILATER-
ALLY RATHER THAN AS A PART OF MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS
THAT INCLUDE A REDUCTION IN THE OVERALL DEFENSE POSTURE
OF WESTERN EUROPE. ADDITIONALLY, THE FRENCH FEAR THAT
MBFR MAY CREATE A SITUATION PERMITTING THE SOVIET UNION
TO ENJOY GREATER INFLUENCE IN THE INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS
OF WESTERN EUROPE. WE SHOULD REAFFIRM THE IMPORTANCE
WE ATTACH TO MBFR, AND SEEK TO PERSUADE THE FRENCH NOT
TO INTERFERE WITH THE ORDERLY PROGRESS OF THESE
NEGOTIATIONS.

14. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT: ALTHOUGH WE ANTI-
CIPATE NO MAJOR CHANGE IN FRANCE'S POLICIES ON ARMS

CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT (E.G. THEY WILL NOT SIGN THE NPT)
GISCARD MAY BE MORE PRAGMATIC THAN HIS PREDECESSOR ON
PRACTICAL QUESTIONS DEALING WITH THE CONTROL OF NUCLEAR
PROLIFERATION. WE SHOULD CONTINUE THE POLICY OF FRANK
AND OPEN CONSULTATIONS ON THIS SUBJECT WHICH WE HAVE
RECENTLY UNDERTAKEN WITH THE FRENCH WITH THE VIEW TOWARD
ARRIVING AT A MORE ACCEPTABLE "DE FACTO" ARRANGEMENT
FOR LIMITING THJNZYQDY OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND EQUIP-
MENT TO NON-NUCLEAR COUNTRIES. WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO
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STRESS THAT THIS ASPECT OF NON-PROLIFERATION IS OF
CRITICAL IMPORTANCE TO THE USG AND TO WORLD STABILITY,
AND THAT WE WISH TO WORK CLOSELY WITH THE FRENCH TO
ACHIEVE A MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENT TO MEET THIS
PROBLEM IN A WAY THAT IS CONSISTENT WITH FRANCE'S VISION
OF ITS "INDEPENDENCE" AND OUR OBJECTIVE OF NON-PROLIFER-
ATION.

15. ECONOMIC - GOLD: DESPITE ACCEPTANCE BY PRESIDENT
POMPIDOU, IN SEPTEMBER 1973, OF SDR AS NUMERAIRE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM, FRANCE HAS PERSISTED
IN ITS EFFORT TO RETAIN AN IMPORTANT ROLE FOR GOLD.
THIS WAS THE ONLY INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ISSUE BESIDES
ENERGY WHICH GISCARD RAISED AT HIS LAST PRESS CONFERENCE,
AND IT IS POSSIBLE HE WILL RAISE IT AGAIN AT MARTINIQUE.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 05 PARIS 26662

EXDIS

GISCARD'S POINTS ARE LIKELY TO BE: A) SINCE GOLD HAS BECOME MORE OF A COMMODITY (BANALISE), COUNTRIES SHOULD BE FREE TO BUY, SELL AND EVALUATE THEIR STOCKS OF GOLD AT A PRICE CLOSE TO THAT OF THE WORLD MARKET. THE ZEIST AGREEMENT, PROVIDING FOR USE OF GOLD AT MARKET-RELATED RATES AS SECURITY FOR INTRA-COMMUNITY LOANS (GERMANY TO ITALY THE FIRST EXAMPLE) WAS A FIRST STEP IN THIS DIRECTION, AND GISCARD HAS EXPRESSED HOPE COMMUNITY WOULD GO REST OF THE WAY BEFORE END OF YEAR. KNOWING US OPPOSITION (TO CENTRAL BANK PURCHASES AND STOCK REVALUATION) AND OUR INFLUENCE WITH EC PARTNERS, GISCARD MAY TRY TO GAIN GREATER US FLEXIBILITY ON THIS ISSUE, AT LEAST INsofar AS INTRA-EC TRANSACTIONS ARE CONCERNED. B) FRANCE IS OPPOSED TO ANY SALES OF GOLD STOCKS BY IMF. FRENCH VIEW IS THAT (1) THESE STOCKS BELONG TO MEMBERS, NOT FUND, AND MUST BE HELD UNTIL DISSOLUTION, (2) GOLD STOCKS SERVE AS IMPORTANT SECURITY FOR BORROWING FROM OIL PRODUCERS.

17. ECONOMIC - STATUS OF TRADE BILL: WHILE THERE IS STILL SOME FEELING IN FRANCE THAT FURTHER TARIFF REDUCTIONS ARE UNWISE IN A WORLD OF "FLOATING" EXCHANGE RATES, THE GOF CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT THE MTN SHOULD GO AHEAD AS PLANNED SINCE OTHERWISE THERE WOULD BE A RISK OF A RESURGENCE OF PROTECTIONISM. THEY WILL WANT TO EVALUATE US TRADE LEGISLATION IN FORMULATING THEIR OWN POSITION ON THE DETAILS OF A COMMUNITY NEGOTIATING POSITION. WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO GIVE THE FRENCH

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AN UP-TO-DATE READING ON THE STATUS OF THE TRADE REFORM ACT OF 1973. FRENCH OFFICIALS WILL BE ESPECIALLY INTERESTED IN THE EXTENT TO WHICH AUTHORITY IS DELEGATED BY THE CONGRESS TO OUR NEGOTIATORS AND WHICH MATTERS MUST BE AD REFERENDUM, DEPENDING ON CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL.

18. DEFENSE: IT REMAINS UNCLEAR WHETHER GISCARD INTENDS ANY SIGNIFICANT SUBSTANTIVE CHANGE IN FRANCE'S DEFENSE POLICY. HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON THIS HAVE BEEN OBSCURE. WE SHOULD PROBE GISCARD'S THINKING ON

- FRANCE'S ROLE IN EUROPEAN DEFENSE
- AREAS FOR MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL BILATERAL MILITARY COOPERATION
- THE FUTURE POSTURE AND STRATEGY FOR FRANCE'S STRATEGIC, TACTICAL NUCLEAR AND

CONVENTIONAL FORCES.

19. DEFENSE - US FORCES IN EUROPE: DESPITE UNWILLINGNESS IN THE PAST TO INTEGRATE ITS FORCES INTO NATO, FRANCE HAS CONTINUED TO FAVOR A STRONG US FORCE POSTURE IN EUROPE. WE SHOULD REASSURE GISCARD OF OUR RESOLVE TO MAINTAIN AN EFFECTIVE FORCE POSTURE IN EUROPE AND EXPLORE WITH HIM HOW FRANCE MAY BETTER CONTRIBUTE TO OVERALL EUROPEAN SECURITY, STRESSING THE IMPORTANCE TO THE LONG TERM US COMMITMENT OF A GREATER EFFORT BY FRANCE AND ALLIES.

ALL OUR NATO ALLIES.

20. DEFENSE - SHARING MILITARY TECHNOLOGY: FRANCE, FOR SOME TIME, HAS BEEN SEEKING US TECHNOLOGY FOR AN AIRBORNE "LOOK DOWN/SHOOT DOWN" PULSE DOPPLER RADAR, ESSENTIAL TO THE SUCCESSFUL DEVELOPMENT OF THE AVION COMBAT FUTUR (ACF). FRANCE HAS ALSO ASKED FOR TECHNOLOGY ON PROTECTIVE SHIELDING OF NUCLEAR PROPULSION

SPACES ON SURFACE SHIPS NEEDED FOR A PLANNED NUCLEAR-POWERED HELICOPTER CARRIER. UNILATERAL FRENCH DEVELOPMENT OF EITHER ITEM WOULD INVOLVE HIGH COSTS AND LONG LEAD TIME. FACED WITH BUDGET CONSTRAINTS, GISCARD MAY EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF BROADENED COOPERATION
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IN THE FIELD OF MILITARY ORIENTED TECHNOLOGY. WHILE WE ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO ASSESS ALL THE PROS AND CONS OF A RELEASE OF SUCH TECHNOLOGY FROM THE US POINT OF VIEW, THE IMPACT ON FRANCE OF DENIAL WOULD BE: A) FAILURE TO OBTAIN US HELP ON A PULSE DOPPLER RADAR WILL BE A SERIOUS BLOW TO THE FRENCH ACF PROGRAM. THE FRENCH MAY RECOGNIZE THE FUTILITY OF INDEPENDENT RADAR DEVELOPMENT WHICH, COUPLED WITH A LAG IN ENGINE TECHNOLOGY, MAY MOVE THEM TO SEEK COOPERATION IN ADAPTATION OF A US AIRCRAFT BY THE FRENCH AIR FORCE. MORE LIKELY DEVELOPMENT HOWEVER, IS THAT THEY WILL DECIDE TO PROCEED INDEPENDENTLY. SINCE THE FIRST FRENCH ACF IS NOT DUE FOR FLIGHT UNTIL 1976, A US DECISION FOR RELEASE OF THE TECHNOLOGY COULD BE DELAYED AT LEAST UNTIL NEXT SPRING, POSSIBLY AFTER DISCUSSION WITH THE FRENCH ON FRANCO-AMERICAN COOPERATION ON AN ENTIRE

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EXDIS

AIRCRAFT WEAPONS SYSTEM. B) THE FRENCH, DESPITE THE ADDITIONAL COSTS AND DEVELOPMENT TIME, WOULD NOT CHANGE THEIR PLAN TO CONSTRUCT A NUCLEAR-POWERED HELICOPTER CARRIER.

21. INDIAN OCEAN: THE FRENCH ARE TAKING AN INCREASING INTEREST IN INDIAN OCEAN DEVELOPMENTS, NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF THE AREA'S KEY ROLE IN PROVIDING AND TRANSPORTING PETROLEUM, BUT ALSO BECAUSE OF SOVIET MILITARY ACTIVITIES THERE. WE HAVE AN ACTIVE DIALOGUE WITH THE UK ON INDIAN OCEAN POLITICAL/MILITARY SUBJECTS. WE SHOULD EXPLORE WITH GISCARD THE POSSIBILITY OF UNDERTAKING A SIMILAR BILATERAL DIALOGUE WITH THE FRENCH. WE MIGHT WANT TO CONSIDER A TRILATERAL (US/UK/FRENCH) DISCUSSION OF SOME ASPECTS OF THE INDIAN OCEAN SITUATION. BEYOND THE IMMEDIATE POLITICAL/MILITARY VALUE OF SUCH CONSULTATIONS, THEY MIGHT LEAD TO MORE PRODUCTIVE COOPERATION BETWEEN WESTERN MILITARY FORCES IN THE AREA.

22. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY: A) NUCLEAR ENERGY: DISCUSSION OF SAFEGUARDS AND PHYSICAL SECURITY MAY BE TIMELY AT THE SUMMIT, DEPENDING ON CURRENT MULTILATERAL DISCUSSIONS. THE FRENCH MAY RAISE THE SUBJECT OF URANIUM ENRICHMENT BY ASKING ABOUT US PLANS TO INCREASE ITS ENRICHMENT CAPACITY. THEY MAY ALSO REQUEST ADDITIONAL DATA ON SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS TO SUPPORT THE FRENCH PUBLIC INFORMATION PROGRAM ON THE PLANNED EXTENSIVE INCREASE IN COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR

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POWER. B) NEW INITIATIVES: US MAY WISH TO PROPOSE A SHORT-TERM HIGH LEVEL JOINT PANEL TO STUDY EXISTING EXCHANGES IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AND RECOMMEND NEW DIRECTIONS AND PROGRAMS. SUCH A PANEL COULD STUDY SUCH QUESTIONS AS US POLICY ON TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND COOPERATION ON ENERGY R&D.

23. CULTURAL: GISCARD HAS PUBLICLY INDICATED HIS INTEREST IN VISITING THE US DURING THE BICENTENNIAL YEAR. THE SUBJECT MAY COME UP IN A DISCUSSION OF FUTURE VISITS OR POSSIBLY RECIPROCAL VISITS BY THE TWO PRESIDENTS. THE FRENCH ARE INTERESTED IN THE BICENTENNIAL. THEY WILL PROVIDE A GIFT OF A SOUND AND LIGHT SHOW AT MOUNT VERNON AND ARE TENTATIVELY PLANNING OTHER ACTIVITIES IN THE US IN 1976. IN FRANCE THE US IS SPONSORING FROM JANUARY TO MARCH 1975 THE WORLD PREMIERE OF A MAJOR BICENTENNIAL EXHIBIT ON THE LIVES OF FRANKLIN AND JEFFERSON. IF THE SUBJECT OF THE BICENTENNIAL COMES UP WE SHOULD EXPRESS OUR GRATITUDE TO THE FRENCH FOR THEIR PLANNED PARTICIPATION.
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